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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of the present appeal pursuant to U.C.A. § 78A-4-l 03 
and Utah R. App. P. 3 because the appeal is taken from a final order resolving all issues 
as to all parties. Additionally, pursuant to an Order issued by the Utah Supreme Court 
this appeal was transferred from the Utah Supreme Court to this Court for resolution. R. 
664-65. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The license holder, Mike's Smoke, Cigar & Gifts (hereinafter "Mike's") raises one 
issue on appeal--whether U.C.A. § 58-37-2(g) should be read in the conjunctive. As 
written, U.C.A. § 58-37-2(g) provides three subsections used in determining whether a 
substance is a controlled substance analog. A conjunctive reading would require meeting 
at least two of the three subsections before a substance could be considered a controlled 
substance analog. More specifically, it would require meeting subsection (A) and (B) or 
(A) and (C) before a substance could be considered a controlled substance analog. 
This specific issue was argued before the St. George City Council at the 
revocation hearing. R. 174-92. The issue was further preserved for appeal through Mike's 
timely petition for judicial review and arguments before the district court. R. 1-8, 317-43, 
and 384-96. The issue was then timely appealed from the district court to the present 
Court. R. 658-60 and Docketing Statement (Dec. 28, 2015). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The Appellant is not aware of any dispositive constitutional provisions applicable 
in this matter. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The present appeal arises out of a license revocation and subsequent judicial 
review of that license revocation. R. 42-58 and 196-98. Mike's is a retail tobacco store 
that has operated in St. George, Utah for several years. R. 17-21 and 643-46. As part of 
its product line Mike's carried tobacco products in addition to products used for the 
consumption of those tobacco products. Id. Mike's also carried sports memorabilia and 
odds and ends such as incense, bumper stickers, vitamins, and supplements. Id. For a 
relatively brief time, Mike's product line also included products commonly known as 
spice but also marketed as incense, herbal incense, potpourri, herbal potpourri, and aroma 
therapy. 1 R. 60-64, 71-78, 92-113, and 115-31.2 
The spice product of concern in the present case was commonly known as 
"Reborn." Id. Over a period of several months, local law enforcement acquired several 
Reborn packages and had them tested by the Utah State Lab for purposes of identifying 
@ the chemical(s) present in the Reborn plant material. Id. The lab tests identified the 
chemical XLR-11 (also known as 5FUR-l l) as present in the Reborn. R. 148, I 63, and 
165 .. Those lab tests also purported that XLR-11 was a controlled substance and alleged 
XLR-11 was an analog of a listed controlled substance commonly known as AM-694. Id. 
1 For purposes of this brief, Mike's will use the term generic term "spice" as Mike's 
acknowledges that there is no meaningful distinction between the different names applied 
to the product. 
2 For purposes of the appellate argument only, Mike's accepts the facts as they relate to 
the possession and sale of Reborn as true but disagrees with any statement of fact 
concluding Reborn contained a controlled substance or controlled substance analog or 
that Mike's knew or intended the product to be a controlled substance or controlled 
substances analog. 
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At no time was Mike's found to possess, market, distribute, or sell any product containing 
a chemical that expressly prohibited at the time Mike's handled it. Compare id. and 
U.C.A §§ 58-37-4 and 4.2 (2012). 
Based on the representation of the Utah State Lab that XLR-11 was a controlled 
substance, the City of St. George (hereinafter "City") elected to revoke the business 
license of Mike's. R. 42-58 and 196-98. Mike's requested a hearing before the City 
Council. R. 200. The primary basis of Mike's challenge to the revocation proceedings 
was that the City lacked sufficient evidence to prove XLR-11 was an analog under 
U.C.A. § 58-37-2(g). R. 174-94, 317-43, and 384-96. This argument focused heavily on 
the proper interpretation of that section of code. Id. More specifically, Mike's maintained 
that U.C.A. § 58-37-2(g) should be read in the conjunctive and not disjunctive. Id. 
Ultimately the City elected to interpret U.C.A. § 58-37-2(g) in the disjunctive. R. 
42-58. Based on the City's interpretation of U.C.A. § 58-37-2(g), the City concluded it 
had sufficient evidence to find Reborn contained a controlled substance analog and 
revoked Mike's business license. Id. 
Mike's sought judicial review of the City's decision. R. 1-8. The two claims raised 
by Mike's were that the City misinterpreted U.C.A. § 58-37-2(g) and the City lacked 
substantial evidence to support its ruling. Id., 317-43, and 384-96. The district court 
concluded that it lacked sufficient information to properly review the matter. R. 4 73-76. 
The information lacking was testimony from the respective experts as to the basis of their 
opinions. Id. The district court then remanded the matter back to the City to hold an 
evidentiary hearing where the experts were to testify. Id. It was contemplated by the 
3 
district court that once the hearing had been completed the matter would be brought back 
@ before the court. Id. Furthermore, the district court did not address Mike's arguments as to 
U.C.A. § 58-37-2(g) at that time and that claim remains outstanding. Id. Nor did the 
district court rule on whether the City had substantial evidence to support its license 
revocation action. Id. 
The City appealed the district court's order. R. 477 and 572-73. The matter was 
brought before this Court in Case No. 20140521-CA. On June 18, 2015, this Court 
overturned the district court's decision and remanded for further proceedings before the 
district court. R. 587-94. 
The parties went back before the district court for oral arguments on October 21, 
2015. R. 622-23. Following oral arguments, the district court issued its Decision and 
Order Affirming Business License Revocation. R. 624-41. In its decision, the district 
court concluded U.C.A. § 58-37-2(g) should be read in the disjunctive and based on this 
@> interpretation, concluded the City has sufficient evidence to uphold the license 
revocation. Id. That decision and order was issued on November 24, 2015. Id. Mike's 
timely filed its Notice of Appeal on December 2, 2015. R. 658-60. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Mike's challenges the City's and district court's decisions concluding U .C.A. § 58-
37-2(g) should be read in the disjunctive. Mike's will argue that a disjunctive reading 
marks a distinct and critical break from federal case law interpreting a federal statute that 
is substantially similarly worded as U.C.A. § 58-37-2(g). Mike's will also argue that a 
disjunctive reading creates absurd results such that the Utah legislature could not have 
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intended them. Finally, Mike's will argue that a disjunctive reading creates numerous 
situations in which U.C.A. § 58-37-2(g) would be unconstitutional. Due to the issues 
raised by a disjunctive reading, Mike's will ask this Court to hold similar to every federal 
court that has addressed this same issue, and find only a conjunctive reading can give 
proper effect to the statute while avoiding the absurd and unconstitutional results brought 
by a disjunctive reading. 
ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-2(g) should be read in the conjunctive to avoid 
absurd results and valid constitutional challenges. 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews interpretation of law de novo, giving no deference to the 
City's, or the district court's, prior interpretations. Meinhard v. State, 2016 UT 12, 124 
(2016). Furthermore, where this Court finds error in the district court's interpretation of 
law, this Court affords no deference to the district court's application of the 
misinterpreted law to the facts of the case. Id. 
B. COMPARISON OF UTAH'S CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE ANALOG 
LAW TO ITS FEDERAL COUNTERPART. 
To fully appreciate the current similarity between U.C.A. § 58-37-2(g) (Utah's 
controlled substance analog definition) and 21 U.S.C. § 802(32) (federal controlled 
substance analog definition), one must first compare their development to their current 
respective points. Below is a side-by-side comparison of the two statute's original 
wording and organization. It should be noted that for purposes of this comparison we are 
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using the introduced bill language for the federal analog law as the language that was 
@ ultimately codified will be discussed later. 
U.C.A. § 58-37-2 (2011) 
(g)(i) "Controlled substance analog" 
means a substance the chemical structure 
of which is substantially similar to the 
chemical structure of a controlled 
substance listed in Schedules I and II of 
Section 58-37-4, a substance listed in 
Section 58-37-4.2, or in Schedules I and II 
of the federal Controlled Substances Act, 
Title II, P.L. 91-513: 
(A) which has a stimulant depressant, or 
hallucinogenic effect on the central 
nervous system substantially similar to the 
stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic 
effect on the central nervous system of 
controlled substances set forth in 
Subsection (1 )(t), or a substance listed in 
Section 58-37-4.2; or 
(B) which, with respect to a particular 
individual, is represented or intended to 
have a stimulant, depressant, or 
hallucinogenic effect on the central 
nervous system substantially similar to the 
stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic 
effect on the central nervous system of 
controlled substances in the schedules or 
list set forth in this Subsection (I). 
( emphasis added). 
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21 U.S.C. § 802(32) as originally 
introduced in H.R. Rep. No. 99-848, 
pt. 1, at I and taken from U.S. v. 
Hodges, 321 F .3d 429, 435 n.4 (3rd 
Cir. 2003). 
The term 'controlled substance 
analog' means a substance --
( i) the chemical structure of which is 
substantially similar to the chemical 
structure of a controlled substance in 
schedule I or II; and 
(ii)(I) which has a stimulant, 
depressant, or hallucinogenic effect 
on the central nervous system; or 
(II) with respect to a particular 
person, which such person 
represents or intends to have a 
stimulant, depressant, or 
hallucinogenic effect on the central 
nervous system substantially similar 
to that of a controlled substance 
A reading of the above recited language denotes both controlled substance analog 
definitions were originally to be read to always require the first subsection along with 
either the second or the third subsection. Consequently, under their original language it 
was evident both statutes were intended to always require at least two of the subsections 
be met before a substance could be considered a controlled substance analog. 
The similarities between the two laws continue as the Utah and federal legislative 
bodies altered their respective controlled substance analog definitions. Each did so for the 
explicit purpose of trying to curb those who would make small changes to a substance in 
an effort to skirt existing controlled substances law. As noted in U.S. v. Hodges, 
Congresses' "only goal" in adopting its present version of its controlled substance analog 
definition was to "make illegal the production of designer drugs and other chemical 
variants of listed controlled substances that otherwise would escape the reach of the drug 
laws." 321 P.3d 429, 437 (3rd Cir. 2003)(citing comments from congressional record 
"This proposal will prevent underground chemists from producing dangerous designer 
drugs by slightly changing the chemical composition of existing illegal drugs."). 
Similarly, when Utah changed its analog definition to its current form, it likewise 
explicitly justified the action as necessary to curb people from making slight changes to 
existing controlled substances to circumvent the law. This was noted by the City in one of 
its early briefs when it stated: 
The Legislature was concerned that chemists were changing the molecular 
structure of substances in the slightest of ways to avoid falling under one of 
the list of controlled substances in Utah's Controlled Substances Act in an 
effort to stay one step ahead of the law .... The Legislature's amendment was 
designed to eliminate this activity. 
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R. 348, Brief of Respondent City of St, George, 5 (Nov. 20, 2013)( citing 
@ comments of Rep. Froer and Sen. Christensen, Debate of H.B. 254, 59th Gen. Leg. Sess. 
(Mar. 1, 2012)). 
With Congress and the Utah legislature sharing the one and only goal of curbing 
minor changes to controlled substances, both took a similar approach. As noted in 
Hodges, Congress removed the conjunctive term ''and" from the proposed language and 
renumbered the subsections so that it was no longer (i) and i(I) and (i)(II) but (i), (ii), and 
(iii). Hodges, 321 F.3d at 438 and 21 U.S.C. § 802(32). Congress then left the disjunctive 
term "or" in between subsections (ii) and (iii). Id. It would appear from such changes that 
Congress intended to make each subsection an equal stand alone prong, any one of which 
could be used to find a substance was a controlled substance analog. 
Similarly, in Utah's 2012 amendment, Utah created three subsections, (A), (B), 
and (C) and placed the disjunctive term "or" between subsection (B) and (C). Compare 
GD U.C.A. § 58-37-2(g)(2011) and U.C.A. § 58-37-2(g)(2012). It is this change that has 
prompted both the City and the district court to conclude the current version of Utah's 
controlled substance analog act requires a disjunctive reading--i.e. that each subsection is 
a stand-alone prong, any one of which may be used to find a substance is a controlled 
substance analog. R. 52-54 and 624-42. 
As it stands today, Congress and the Utah legislature have reached remarkably 
similar points, with remarkably similar purpose, with remarkably similar verbiage in their 
respective statutes even though the changes were years apart and with no apparent 
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influence between the two. A side-by-side of the current versions of the two analog 
definitions demonstrates this point. 
U .C.A. § 58-37-2 
(g) (i) "Controlled substance analog" means: 
(A) a substance the chemical structure of 
which is substantially similar to the 
chemical structure of a controlled substance 
listed in Schedules I and II of Section 58-37-
4, a substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2, or 
in Schedules I and II of the federal 
Controlled Substances Act, Title II, P.L. 91-
513; 
(B) a substance which has a stimulant, 
depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the 
central nervous system substantially similar 
to the stimulant, depressant, or 
hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous 
system of controlled substances listed in 
Schedules I and II of Section 58-3 7-4, 
substances listed in Section 58-37-4.2, or 
substances listed in Schedules I and II of the 
federal Controlled Substances Act, Title II, 
P.L. 91-513; 
or 
(C) A substance which, with respect to a 
particular individual, is represented or 
intended to have a stimulant, depressant, or 
hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous 
system substantially similar to the stimulant, 
depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the 
central nervous system of controlled 
substances listed in Schedules I and II of 
Section 58-37-4, substances listed in Section 
58-37-4.2, or substances listed in Schedules I 
and II of the federal Controlled Substances 
Act, Title II, P.L. 91-513. 
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21 U.S.C. § 802(32) 
(A) Except as provided in subparagraph 
(C), the term "controlled substance 
analogue" means a substance--
(i) the chemical structure of which is 
substantially similar to the chemical 
structure of a controlled substance in 
schedule I or II; 
(ii) which has a stimulant, depressant, 
or hallucinogenic effect on the central 
nervous system that is substantially 
similar to or greater than the stimulant, 
depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on 
the central nervous system of a 
controlled substance in schedule I or 11; 
or 
(iii) with respect to a particular person, 
which such person represents or 
intends to have a stimulant, depressant, 
or hallucinogenic effect on the central 
nervous system that is substantially 
similar to or greater than the stimulant, 
depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on 
the central nervous system of a 
controlled substance in schedule I or II. 
@ 
( emphasis added). 
The similarities are fairly obvious, nevertheless it is important to note that each 
statute contains three subparts with each subpart containing substantially the same 
terminology as its state or federal counterpart. The first subpart of each looks to the 
chemical structure of the substance. The second subpart looks to the pharmacological 
effect of the substance. The third subpart looks to the intent and/or representations of the 
person. 
It is even more important to note that each statute lists all three subparts with the 
disjunctive "or" placed only between the second and third subsections. No connecting 
term is placed between the first and second subsections. 
Given the legislative history of the federal analog law and its current wording, it 
would seem obvious that the statute should be afforded a disjunctive reading. However, 
the federal courts are in complete uniformity that the federal analog law must be read in 
the conjunctive. See U.S. v. Turcotte, 405 F.3d 515, 522 (7th Cir. 2004); U.S. v. Klecker, 
228 F.Supp.2d 720, 727 (E.D. Va. 2002); and Hodge, 321 F.3d at 436.3 The federal 
courts have each reached this conclusion for three primary reasons, the first being the 
3 Each of the cited cases discusses the uniformity of federal court holding the federal 
analog law must be read in the conjunctive with a couple citing to a single example of a 
@ federal court holding the law should be read in the disjunctive. That federal case was a 
district court case out of the Virgin Islands. U.S. v. Greig, 144 F. Supp.2d 386 (D. Vi. 
2001 ). Greig was later overturned by the Third Circuit in Hodges where the court stated, 
"[t]he District Court in this case read the definition disjunctively, but every other federal 
court to consider the issue has read it conjunctively." Hodges, 321 F.3d at 433. Hodges 
Q, itself went on to overturn Grieg and hold the statute had to be read in the conjunctive. Id. 
Consequently, these is now complete uniformity in the federal courts mandating a 
conjunctive reading. 
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absurd results that would follow from a disjunctive reading, the second--somewhat 
related--reason being that Congress could not have intended the absurd results that would 
follow, and third, the absurd results would open the law to valid constitutional challenges. 
We tum now to the federal courts' reasoning in holding the federal analog law must be 
read in the conjunctive. 
C. THE FEDERAL AND STATE ANALOG LAWS MUST BE READ IN 
THE CONJUNCTIVE TO AVOID ABSURDITIES THAT COULD NOT HAVE 
BEEN INTENDED BY THE LEGISLATURE AND WOULD ULTIMATELY 
PROVE TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN A NUMBER OF CONTEXTS. 
This Court is now being asked to interpret a statute that is substantially similar to 
the federal controlled substance analog law. Fortunately, this Court has the benefit of 
several federal cases which have previously addressed the very question posed to this 
Court in the present case--namely, should the analog law be read in the conjunctive or the 
disjunctive? This Court may very well echo the words of the Seventh Circuit when it 
stated, "[a]s the old adage instructs, the devil is in the details--the relevant detail here 
being the single word 'or' between clauses (ii) and (iii) of the definition." U.S. v. Turcotte, 
405 F.3d 5 I 5, 52 I (7th Cir. 2005). 
The City and district court purport the supposed unambiguous language and 
legislative intent mandate a disjunctive reading. This position is primarily predicated on 
the "or" contained in U.C.A. § 58-37-2(g). However, as noted in Hodges, "[w]e have said 
that 'canons of construction ordinarily suggest that terms connected by a disjunctive be 
given separate meaning unless the context dictates otherwise' ... .Indeed, we have also said 
that 'whether requirements in a statute are to be treated as disjunctive or conjunctive does 
11 
@ 
@ 
not always tum on whether the word 'or' is used; rather it turns on context."' 321 F.3d at 
~ 436.4 Therefore, simply seeing the word "or" in U.C.A. § 58-37-2(g) does not 
automatically mean the term unambiguously renders the statute disjunctive. Rather, this 
Court should engaged in a contextual analysis similar to that afforded by the federal 
courts. 
A contextual analysis demonstrates the absurd results that follows a disjunctive 
reading. This position is best summarized by the Seventh Circuit in Turcotte where it 
noted the federal courts were holding the analog law had to be read in the conjunctive 
based "largely on the absurd results that might obtain under a disjunctive reading, noting 
that alcohol and caffeine could be criminalized as controlled substance analogues based 
solely on the fact that, in concentrated form, they might have depressant or stimulant 
effects similar to illegal drugs." 405 F.3d at 522. These absurdities can be reviewed by 
looking at each prong independently, just as one would if the prong were to remain a 
~ stand-alone prong. 
1. Prong One as a Stand-Alone Prong Yields the Absurd Result of Criminalizing 
Monosodium Glutamate {MSG) Due to a Similarity in Chemical Structure to a Controlled 
Substance. 
In U.S. v. Washam, the Eighth Circuit analyzed the federal analog law as it applied 
to 1,4-Butanediol, which was alleged to be a controlled substance analog of GHB. 312 
~ F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 2002). As part of that case the Government brought in expert witnesses 
4 See also U.S. v. Vickery, stating "the mere existence of 'or' between the last two 
~ subordinate clauses cannot be taken to be conclusive evidence that Congress intended all 
subordinate clauses to be read in the disjunctive." 199 F. Supp.2d 1363, 1367 (N .D. Ga. 
2002). 
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to prove GHB and 1,4-Butanediol differed one side of a single molecule. Id. at 928. The 
defendant in Washam challenged his conviction under the federal analog law by claiming 
the law was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 929. 
As part of his constitutional challenge, Washam pointed out that MSG, commonly 
found in every day foods such as Dorito chips, is literally transformed into GHB once 
inside the human body. Id. at 932. Washam argued the statute was unconstitutionally 
vague as it allowed for enforcement against both 1,4-Butanediol and MSG. Id. The court 
disagreed, holding: 
[t]here is some superficial appeal to Washam's comparison between 1,4-
Butanediol and MSG, the common food additive that also becomes GHB in 
the human body. But Washam's argument that the Analogue Statute lends 
itself to arbitrary enforcement because it allows for a distinction between 
the two substances is flawed. The statute does not allow for arbitrary 
enforcement because the statute itself requires a two-step inquiry .... The first 
step in the statute is to determine whether a chemical is substantially similar 
in chemical structure to a listed chemical. Beyond this inquiry is the 
requirement that the chemical either has the same effect as the listed 
chemical on the human body, or it is intended to have such an effect. 
Utilizing these two steps, MSG could not be proscribed by the Analogue 
Statute. While MSG may be substantially similar in physical and chemical 
structure to GHB ... MSG does not have similar effects on the human body, 
nor do food producers intend for MSG to have the same effect as GHB. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
MSG is not the only substance that presented a problem when analyzed on a 
structural comparison alone. The Washam court noted that in U.S. v. Roberts, a federal 
district court had held the federal analog law was unconstitutionally vague as applied 
because other food substances such as Gamma Aminobutyric Acid (GABA) and succinic 
acid "were as similar to GHB as 1,4-Butanediol, differing only in one functional group." 
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Id. at 932-33 (analyzing U.S. v. Roberts, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16778 (S.D.N.Y. 
@ 2002)).5 
Washam and Roberts both demonstrate that if prong one, the chemical structure 
prong, is left as a stand-alone prong, it generates the absurd result of criminalizing 
everyday food items. Indeed, every food item containing MSG, Gamma Aminobutyric 
Acid (GABA), or succinic acid would quite literally be illegal for containing substances 
substantially structurally similar to the controlled substance GHB. The key for avoiding 
this absurd, and unconstitutionally vague result, was to read the analog law in the 
conjunctive. 
2. Prong Two as a Stand-Alone Prong Yields the Absurd Result of 
Criminalizing Caffeine, Tobacco, Alcohol, Energy Drinks, and/or Aromatherapy 
Products Due to Their Ability to Produce Similar Pharmacological Results as a 
Controlled Substance. 
In U.S. v. Vickery, the defendant was indicted under the federal controlled 
substance analog law for distributing 1,4 butanediol and GBL, both of which are 
considered controlled substance analogs of GHB. 199 F. Supp.2d 1363, 1364 (N.D. Ga. 
2002). The defendant sought review specifically to determine if the federal controlled 
@ substance analog law should be read in the conjunctive or disjunctive. Id. 
In addressing the question raised by the defendant, the court in Vickery turned, in 
part, to "another canon of statutory interpretation," that canon being that a statute must be 
5 Roberts was later overturned by the Second Circuit in U.S. v. Roberts, 363 F.3d 118 
(2nd Cir. 2004) when the Second Circuit applied a conjunctive reading of the statute and 
found the statute constitutional under a conjunctive reading. 
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construed to avoid unintended or absurd results." Id. at 1369. In addressing this canon of 
statutory construction, the Vickery court noted 
A reading of clause (ii) independently results in alcohol or caffeine 
becoming a controlled substance analogue, given the depressant or 
stimulant effect such substances have in concentrated form. Without tying 
the first clause of the statute in with the latter clauses, the statute loses its 
link between the unknown drugs and the drugs already controlled under the 
Controlled Substance Act, which is critical to the Act's stated purpose .... 
Id. 
In addition to noting the absurd results that would result from a disjunctive 
reading, the court in Vickery also noted that "there is no indication in the legislative 
history that Congress intended to dispense with both limiting provisions [ subsections (ii) 
and (iii)] and create a statute in which nearly any substance could be prosecuted as a 
controlled substance analogue." Id. at 13 71 ( emphasis added). Accordingly, the court in 
Vickery concluded the analog law must be read in the conjunctive. 
Vickery's concerns were echoed in U.S. v. Forbes, which opined that a disjunctive 
reading of UCA § 58-37-2(g) will lead to unintended and absurd results thus rendering 
the statute vague and unconstitutional. The court stated that a conjunctive reading of the 
statute: 
If I adopt the government's construction and read clause (ii) independently, alcohol 
or caffeine would be controlled substance analogues because, in concentrated 
form, they can have depressant or stimulant effects substantially similar to a 
controlled substance. 
806 F. Supp 232 (D. Colo. 1992). 
Similarly, in U.S. v. Turcotte, the Seventh Circuit expressed concern over the 
absurd results that would stem from a disjunctive reading of the analog law "noting that 
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alcohol and caffeine could be criminalized as a controlled substance analogues based 
@) solely on the fact that, in concentrated form, they might have depressant or stimulant 
effects similar to illegal drugs." 405 F.3d 515, 522-23 (7th Cir. 2005). The court in 
Turcotte also echoed Vickery's concern that Congress could have never intended such 
criminalization when Turcotte quoted "there is 'not a scintilla of evidence' that 'Congress 
intended to cover and criminalize sales of legal substances such as flour, salt, ginseng, 
vitamin B, etc."' Id. at 523. With those concerns in mind, Turcotte decided to "heed the 
call of both accumulated precedent and common sense, joining the vast majority of 
federal courts in adopting the conjunctive reading of [21] U.S.C. § 802(32)(A)." Id. 
Consider for a moment an FDA report issued in March 2013 which linked energy 
drinks to multiple deaths and listing numerous health risks posed by energy drinks. R. 
@ 
269-82. Consider a wealth of articles detailing the rising health concerns with energy 
drinks. R. 284-96. Given the now well documented health hazards of energy drinks, the 
@ youth attraction to energy drinks, and the youths' tendency to abuse energy drinks, what 
is to stop an enterprising prosecutor or city council from turning to the controlled 
substance analog law as a tool for prosecution or license revocation? Indeed, such 
ingenuity has been done before in Utah. 
While prosecutors were waiting for the State to take action m criminalizing 
chemicals commonly found in spice they turned to the glue huffing statute in an effort to 
take matters into their own hands. Undersigned counsel personally handled several such 
cases including, but not limited to such a case involving the City of St. George and the 
owner of Mike's, Michael Connors. City of St. George v. Connors, Washington County, 
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Justice Court, Case No. 101701872, prosecuting for spice under U.C.A. § 76-10-107, 
more commonly known as the glue huffing statute. If cities and prosecutors were willing 
to move unilaterally against spice through attempting to adapt other statutes, what is to 
prevent them from doing so again on substances such as energy drinks? The short answer 
is nothing. Consequently, the public at large bears the risk that at any given moment a 
city or prosecutor could charge them with possessing and/or distributing a controlled 
substance analog. Given the documented health risks of energy drinks and the link 
between those drinks and deaths in the country, such a situation is not so far-fetched. 
The absurd results generated by a stand-alone prong two can only be avoided by 
giving the law a conjunctive reading. Something the Turcotte court found to be a 
"common sense" interpretation. Utah's analog law is no different. Standing alone, its 
second prong generates the same absurd results as those identified by the federal courts. 
This Court should interpret U.C.A. § 58-37-2(g) in the conjunctive to avoid such absurd 
results. 
3. Prong Three as a Stand-Alone Prong Yields the Absurd Result of 
Criminalizing Virtually Any and All Products Due to The Fact They Would be an 
Analog Purely on a Person's Representation That They Will Produce Similar 
Pharmacological Results as a Controlled Substance. 
Out of the three subparts the City contends should be stand-alone prongs, the third 
is perhaps the most alarming as a stand-alone prong. This is because under the third 
prong (if it were a stand-alone prong), the mere representation that a substance will 
generate a pharmacological result similar to a controlled substance is sufficient to render 
the substance a controlled substance analog. To be clear, this prong does not require the 
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person making the representation to claim the substance is a controlled substance (i.e. 
@ selling flour while claiming it is cocaine), rather it only requires a representation that the 
product in its natural state will generate a similar result as a controlled substance (i.e. 
representing enough sugar can give a rush similar to cocaine or an amphetamine). 
Furthermore, this prong does not even require the representation to be true. In other 
words, a person could represent to another that using a ginseng supplement will give the 
user a euphoria akin to heroin. Such a representation is almost certainly untrue, but it 
matters not, as the representation alone is sufficient to render the ginseng a controlled 
substance analog. 
Again, such claims are not the whimsical fancies of the Appellant, but genuine 
concerns voiced in the federal courts. For example, the court in Vickery concluded that, 
to allow the Government to succeed in a prosecution under the Analogue Act by 
proving only subsection (iii) of the statute results in an application much broader 
than the stated purpose of the statute - thwarting evasion of the drug laws by 
underground chemists who create new drugs. There is no indication in the 
legislative history that "Congress intended to cover and criminalize the sales of 
legal substances such as flour, salt, ginseng, vitamin B, etc., merely because the 
seller represents they will yield a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect 
like that of a controlled substance. 
Vickery, 199 F. Supp.2d at 13 70 ( emphasis added) ( internal citations omitted). See 
also Turcotte, 405 F.3d at 523. 
The absurd results become even more absurd when one considers the 
consequences as between individual people in the State of Utah. For instance if one 
@ person makes a representation about ginseng that renders ginseng a controlled substance 
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analog, is ginseng now a controlled substance analog for all people in the State or just the 
person making the representation? Under the former proposition, a single person's act can 
render an otherwise perfectly legal item illegal for every person in the state quite literally 
on a single tum of phrase. 
Such absurdities are the result of a disjunctive reading of the analog statute. These 
absurdities have been recognized by the federal courts as real, valid, and concerning 
results if the analog law is to be read in the disjunctive. To avoid such absurd results, the 
federal courts have consistently and uniformly come to hold the analog law must be read 
in the conjunctive. This Court should likewise act to avoid these absurd results by 
interpreting Utah's analog law in the conjunctive. 
D. LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND THE STATUTORY DOCTRINES OF 
AVOIDING ABSURDITIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE DICTATE 
A CONJUNCTIVE READING OF UTAH'S ANALOG LAW. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "when statutory language is ambiguous-in 
that its terms remain susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations after we 
have conducted a plain language analysis-we generally resort to other modes of 
statutory construction and "seek guidance from legislative history" and other accepted 
sources." Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch Partnership, 2011 UT 50, ,r1s, 267 P.3d 863 
(Utah 2011 ). The Utah Supreme Court further instructed that, 
[g]enerally, when interpreting statutes we seek to avoid interpretations 
"which render some part of a provision nonsensical or absurd." Thus, when 
"'statutory language ... presents the court with two alternative readings, we 
prefer the reading that avoids absurd results."' In defining the parameters of 
what constitutes an absurd result, we have noted that such a "result must be 
so absurd that the legislative body which authored the legislation could not 
have intended it." 
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Id. at 126 and p. 869. 
Based on the Utah Supreme Court's language it is settled that this Court must first 
look to the plain language of the statute. If the statute is ambiguous (i.e. it is susceptible 
to two or more interpretations) then this Court may turn to other canons of statutory 
construction such as legislative history, the rule against absurdities, and constitutional 
avoidance. 
No doubt, the City takes the position U.C.A. § 58-37-2(g) is clear and 
unambiguous. The City adopts this position based on the presence of the term "or" 
between the second and third prongs of the statute. However, as has been previously 
stated, both Hodges and Vickery are both quick to point out that the presence of "or" in a 
list of items does not automatically or conclusively result in the disjunctive applying 
through the entire list. Hodges, 321 F .3d at 436 and Vickery, 199 F. Supp.2d at 1367. It is 
not enough for the City to simply point to the "or" as if that is the end all in statutory 
@ analysis. Rather, as stated in Hodges, the "or" itself needs to be analyzed in the context of 
the entire statute to determine if it should be applied throughout. 
In the present case, a contextual analysis of the statute lends itself to competing 
interpretations as to whether the "or" should apply throughout. Not the least of which is 
the fact that subsections (B) and (C) are of similar nature whereas subsection (A) is quite 
unique. Subsection (A) relates entirely with the substances physical form and structure 
and does not concern itself with any pharmacological effects. In contrast both subsections 
(B) and (C) are entirely concerned with pharmacological effects and not at all with 
structure. Subsections (B) and (C) present two alternatives for determining 
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pharmacological effect with subsection (B) looking to actual effects and subsection (C) 
looking to the represented or intended effects. 
Because subsections (B) and (C) present two alternatives to the same 
determination--pharmacological effects--it stands to reason that the disjunctive "or" 
would appear between them. It therefore makes sense to see how the statute can be read 
to require subsection (A) in all cases, but permit a choice between subsections (8) and 
(C) as those two subsections both deal with pharmacology. Accordingly, the plain 
language and contextual driven analysis results in the statute being ambiguous as to its 
application of the term "or". 
The City also purports, that even if this Court were to consider the legislative 
history in order to divine intent, it would hold the statute should be read in the 
disjunctive. This is perhaps the City's strongest argument as the legislative history does 
contain strong language evidencing an intent to treat each subsection as a stand-alone 
prong. See H.B. 254 (enrolled copy), 11. 11-15, available at 
http://le.utah.gov/----2012/bills/static/HB0254.html. However, even with this stated intent, 
the picture is not so clear. 
A review of the legislative history, including the recorded audio of the "debates," 
demonstrates two things: first, the legislature was passing the amendment at the 
recommendation of the State purely to make prosecutions easier6; and second, the focus 
6 This is an important consideration as it was never contended that the State could not 
successfully prosecute these types of cases under the conjunctive approach. Rather, the 
State simply wanted the prosecutions to be easier. When the interest of prosecutorial 
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was entirely on subsection (A) with absolute no thought or consideration going into the 
\@ effects of making subsections (B) and (C) stand-alone prongs. This is problematic in that 
it generates manifestly clear competing and contradictory legislative purposes and intent. 
If this Court stops at the legislature's stated intent and interprets U.C.A. § 58-37-
2(g) in the disjunctive all of the absurd results previously detailed become a reality. 
Neither the City or the district court has presented any reasonable explanation as to how 
such absurd consequences can be avoided under a disjunctive reading. A disjunctive 
reading in the interest of legislative intent is therefore tantamount to claiming the 
legislature intended to criminalize caffeine, coffee, soda, energy drinks, alcohol, tobacco, 
ginseng, flour, wax, vitamin B, MSG, GABA, and the like. Certainly, the City, the 
district court, and this Court cannot reasonably claim the legislature intended to 
criminalize everyday household items. To the contrary, the legislature's intent was to 
target designer drug manufacturers, not peddlers of Coca-Cola. However, the intent to 
target designer drug manufacturers and not Folgers coffee is obliterated through a 
disjunctive reading. Consequently there are two contradictory legislative intents at work, 
the first seeks to make prosecution easier through making subsection (A) a stand-alone 
prong; and the second seeks to target designer drug manufacturers and not Doritos chips. 
A disjunctive reading gives effect to the former whereas a conjunctive reading gives 
effect to the latter. 
economy is weighed against mass criminalization of household items it hardly seems 
appropriate or what the legislature truly intended. 
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It is here perhaps that the other rules of statutory construction are useful. The rule 
requiring interpretation avoiding absurd results was cited above. In addition to that rule is 
the canon of constitutional avoidance. That canon was set forth by the Utah Supreme 
Court when it held, 
[t]he canon of constitutional avoidance is an important tool for identifying 
and implementing legislative intent. Its premise is a presumption that the 
legislature "either prefers not to press the limits of the Constitution in its 
statutes, or it prefers a narrowed ( and constitutional) version of its statutes 
to a statute completely stricken" by the courts. Thus, when a court rejects 
one of two plausible constructions of a statute on the ground that it would 
raise grave doubts as to its constitutionality, it shows proper respect for the 
legislature, which is assumed to "legislate[] in the light of constitutional 
limitations." 
Utah DOT v. Carlson, 2014 UT 24, if23, 332 P.3d 900, 905 (Utah 
20 l 4)(internal citations omitted). 
The absurd results of a disjunctive reading manifest the situations in which valid 
challenges for vagueness as applied under the State and federal constitutions may be 
asserted. Indeed, many of the federal cases determining how to interpret the federal 
analog law were the result of a defendant's challenge for vagueness. See Washam, 312 
F .3d 926. In those cases where the federal analog statute was challenged for vagueness it 
was often upheld as constitutional due to a conjunctive reading of the statute. See id. In 
other words, a conjunctive reading prevents the statute from being rendered 
unconstitutional due to the absurd results that would have flowed from a disjunctive 
reading. 
It is important to note two characteristics of the constitutional avoidance doctrine. 
The first is that the doctrine does not ask if the discarded reading would in fact make the 
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statute unconstitutional, but rather if the discarded reading merely raises grave doubts as 
@ to the constitutionality of the statute. Second, the rule explicitly states that this Court is 
actually showing proper respect for, and giving effect to, the legislative intent when it 
rejects an interpretation that may render the statute unconstitutional. Therefore, under this 
rule, this Court can interpret U.C.A. § 58-37-2(g) in the conjunctive in order to avoid 
constitutional challenges and such a finding would in fact be giving effect to legislative 
intent when that intent is considered in light of constitutional considerations. 
Because U.C.A. § 58-37-2(g) is ambiguous as to its application of the term "or", 
and because the legislature presents this Court with competing and contradictory 
legislative intent, it is proper for this Court to tum to other canons of statutory 
construction. Pursuant to those canons, in particular the rule of avoiding absurdities and 
constitutional avoidance, this Court should interpret U.C.A. § 58-37-2(g) to be read in the 
conjunctive. Meaning, the City must show the alleged analog in the present case is (A) 
@ substantially structurally similar to a controlled substance and that the alleged analog is 
either (B) substantially similar in its pharmacological effect as a controlled substance; or 
(C) that Mike's intended or represented the alleged analog to have a substantially similar 
pharmacological effect as a controlled substance. 
CONCLUSION 
The Seventh Circuit in Turcotte identified a conjunctive reading as the "common 
sense" interpretation. It further found the conjunctive reading to be in line with a wealth 
of precedent set before by courts across the country. In reviewing the various decisions 
that have come out it becomes apparent why the Seventh Circuit viewed a conjunctive 
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reading as the common sense approach. A disjunctive reading creates three stand-alone 
prongs, each of which when left on its own creates absurd results. 
These results range from the criminalization of structurally similar substances such 
as MSG to the criminalization of pharmacologically similar substances such as caffeine. 
These absurd results are not the intent of the legislature. Rendering an interpretation that 
permits the criminalization of virtually every common household item would be a grave 
injustice to the heart of the legislative intent, which was to stop designer drug 
manufacturers for the protection of the public. Criminalizing the public at large in the 
same fell swoop as criminalizing designer drugs certainly runs contrary to the legislative 
intent in amending U.C.A. § 58-37-2(g). This is particularly true when it is remembered 
that the amendment to U.C.A. § 58-37-2(g) was made purely to make prosecutions easier, 
not because previous prosecutions had failed. One cannot reasonably conclude the 
legislature meant to engage in mass criminalization of everyday household items purely 
in the name of prosecutorial economy. 
This Court has tools for statutory construction which render a result that avoids 
these absurd results, avoids constitution challenges, and maintains the legislative intent of 
stopping designer drugs. That construction is through a conjunctive reading. Accordingly, 
the Appellant, Mike's Smoke Shop, respectfully requests this Court find U.C.A. § 58-37-
2(g) must be read in the conjunctive. Meaning, the City must show the alleged analog in 
the present case is (A) substantially structurally similar to a controlled substance and that 
the alleged analog is either (B) substantially similar in its pharmacological effect as a 
controlled substance; or (C) that Mike's intended or represented the alleged analog to 
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have a substantially similar pharmacological effect as a controlled substance. Mike's also 
respectfully requests this Court overturn the district court's decision to uphold the license 
revocation and overturn the City's license revocation. Finally, Mike's respectfully 
requests this Court remand this matter to the district court with instructions to apply a 
conjunctive reading of the statute to the facts of this case. 
DATED this 25th day of April 20 16. 
R<an L. Holdaway 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
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